Militär propaganda i SvD Brännpunkt

Vår strategi är i sin naturen defensiv Ett uttalande som minst sagt missledande om man inte läst orginal rapporten tidigare. Vad rapporten egentligen talar för är en konstant militarisering av det som hittils kallats ett civilt samhälle där i princip allt från kriminalitet till energiförsörjning har en militärkomponent. Detta för att möta ’civilisationskritiska’ hot mot västs sätt att leva.

För att citera mig själv i ett tidigare blogginlägg

Det kan också vara värt att uppmärksamma de strukturella förändringarna generalerna från de olika NATO länderna vill ha, med nya beslutsvägar inom NATO och ett samlat beslutsorgan för USA, EU och NATO länder och inte minst ett slut på EUs obstruktion och rivalitet med NATO. Bland förändringarna finns detta med:

  • De vill ta bort konsensus beslut inom alla delar av NATO till förmån för majoritets beslut. Inga mer nationella veto.
  • Inga mer nationella förbehåll för hur styrkor ska användas som det idag finns i Afghanistan. För svensk del antar jag detta innebär att även våra styrkor ska kunna användas i anfallsstrid.
  • Medlemmar som inte deltar i operationer har heller inget röst i hur NATO agerar.
  • Användandet av militärt våld utan beslut i FN säkerhetsråd när “omedelbara beslut när nödvändiga för att skydda stora grupper av människor”.


Att orginaltexten ser ut så här
i artikeln får mig att undra varför t ex delen om en ökad integration mellan EU, NATO och FN i under NATO flagg fallit bort eller att avsikten är att ta bort restriktioner som den enskilda medlemländerna lagt på användandet av trupper i Afghanistan. Eller delen om att Europa måste integrerar mer med USA och tillhandahålla mer trupper.

By its nature, our proposed strategy is defensive. It seeks to protect the NATO countries. Nobody who will read the paper can misunderstand this. It uses a modular approach to alliances by integrating the capabilities of different international organizations as well as countries that are not members of NATO or any alliance. Furthermore, it requires a sustained commitment until the pre-determined objective is achieved, an objective that neither aims at conquest nor seeks to impose NATO’s preferred political order on an adversary.

The concept is generic, but could be used best by a truly transformed NATO. Given that military means no longer suffice, we emphasize the great importance of improved cooperation between NATO, the United Nations, and the European Union. NATO must find ways to avail itself of the instruments and resources that other international organizations have at their disposal. To this end, cooperation between NATO and the EU in particular must be improved. The UN will also continue to play an important role, since it is the only body that can legalize interventions – be they military or non-military – in all cases that are not just self-defense.

(..)

In particular, NATO is facing a real challenge in Afghanistan, where self-imposed restrictions deprive NATO of the possibility of success. More generally, the gap between the missions NATO is asked to take on and the means it has to face these challenges is growing day by day.

Sen kan man undra på vems uppdrag dyker detta upp nu.

Några mer citat från den ursprungliga rapporten som ska lämnas till NATO mötet i Bukarest. Notera att den kommer från 5 NATO-länders före detta överbefälhavare. Och att att den skrivist efter konsultationer med det säkerhespolitiska etablismemanget i Europa och USA.

Should the world fail to find a solution to Iran’s nuclear ambitions,
the NPT could be damaged beyond repair and nuclear
weapons proliferation could spread. An Iranian nuclear weapons
capability would pose a major strategic threat – not only
to Israel, which it has threatened to destroy, but also to the
region as a whole, to Europe and to the United States.
Secondly, it could be the beginning of a new multi-polar nuclear
arms race in the most volatile region of the world.
[..]
The European Union is currently
developing a common energy policy, which concentrates
on reduced emissions, on efficiency targets and on subsidising
biofuel and securing diversification of energy sources by trade
arrangements. There is no discussion about the protection of
energy sources and of their means of transportation. The
European Union is using soft instruments, and this is unlikely
to protect energy security, which will require deeper
transatlantic cooperation and coordination. For this reason, it
might well be worth considering using NATO as an instrument
of energy security.
In some cases, valuable natural resources are in countries that
are plagued by civil war and so do not benefit the ordinary citizens.

[..]
In addition, the distinction between international organised
crime and terrorism is becoming increasingly blurred.
[..]
Simultaneously observing proportionality and damage limitation
will become extremely difficult in cases where the use of
nuclear weapons must be considered. The first use of nuclear
weapons must remain in the quiver of escalation as the ultimate
instrument to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction,
in order to avoid truly existential dangers
. At first
glance, it may appear disproportionate; but taking account of
the damage that it might prevent, it could well be proportionate.
Despite the immense power of destruction possessed by
nuclear weapons, the principle of damage limitation remains
valid and must be kept in mind. Indeed, it was one of the
principles that governed NATO’s nuclear planning during the
Cold War.

(..)

Another principle is legality. All action must be legitimate,
properly authorised and in general accordance with customary
international law. This is a grave impediment in combating
opponents who show not the slightest respect for any law; but
acting differently would, in the end, mean applying the law
of the jungle and eroding our own credibility. This principle
does not, however, rule out the necessary adaptation of existing
international law to the changing international environment,
since no legal culture – national or international – is
ever static
. This concerns jus ad bellum, jus in bello and the
authorisation to use force.
(..)

One truly indispensable element of any strategy in the 21st
century is deterrence. This will no longer be deterrence by
punishment, nor the threat of total destruction, which served
us so well in preserving peace during the Cold War.
In the Post-Westphalian world, and against non-state actors,
such deterrence does not work. What is needed is a new deterrence,
which conveys a single, unambiguous message to all
enemies: There is not, and never will be, any place where you
can feel safe; a relentless effort will be made to pursue you and
deny you any options you might develop to inflict damage upon
us.

What is needed is a policy of deterrence by proactive
denial, in which pre-emption is a form of reaction when
a threat is imminent, and prevention is the attempt to regain
the initiative in order to end the conflict.

Escalation is intimately linked to the option of using an instrument
first. A strategy that views escalation as an element
can, therefore, neither rule out first use nor regard escalation
as pre-programmed and inevitable
. Escalation and de-escalation
must be applied flexibly. Escalation is thus no longer a
ladder on which one steps from rung to rung; it is much more
a continuum of actions, as though there is a ‘trampoline’ that
permits the action to be propelled up into the sky at one moment
and just to stand still the next.
—-

Nuclear weapons are the ultimate instrument of an asymmetric
response – and at the same time the ultimate tool of escalation.

Escalation is intimately linked to the option of using an instrument
first. A strategy that views escalation as an element
can, therefore, neither rule out first use nor regard escalation
as pre-programmed and inevitable. Escalation and de-escalation
must be applied flexibly. Escalation is thus no longer a
ladder on which one steps from rung to rung; it is much more
a continuum of actions, as though there is a ‘trampoline’ that
permits the action to be propelled up into the sky at one moment
and just to stand still the next.
(..)
During this second phase of strategy implementation, the involvement
of the UN might become necessary, as the UN is,
at this time, the only body that can legalise coercive measures
to be taken against another state, which could itself be the
opposition or else could be harbouring hostile non-state actors
(whether at its own invitation or because the state is a failing
state no longer capable of executing its powers).
(..)
It should be noted that, in today’s interconnected world, the
opposition will be closely following all debates in the country
or alliance as it tries to find a solution. Thus all public debates,
necessary as they are in democracies, must take account
of this undesired side effect, as they could well provide encouragement
for the opposition to drive a wedge into a nation’s
or an alliance’s cohesion. Domestic debates could easily
increase the danger of terrorist attack
– a powerful instrument
of asymmetric response aimed at weakening a nation’s or alliance’s
resolve to see the action through.
(..)
For the USA to play its role as effectively as possible, the
transatlantic bargain between the European countries, Canada
and their American ally must be renewed. All of America’s
European allies acknowledge that their relationship with the
USA is indispensable. But in order to convince the US to
enter into a renewed bargain, Europe needs, in return, to become
a truly indispensable partner to the US. There is a heavy onus on the Europeans to prove their worth
here, not least in improving their own capabilities. If they do not do so, then there is no incentive for America to enter into such a bargain. To bring about renewal, Europe will have to
pay the price of enhancing its capabilities. Once that is under
way, then the transatlantic partners can agree on a better balance
in sharing decision making and carrying the burden of
implementation.

SvD » Brännpunkt » Inte bara vapen för militärt Nato

Varför behövs då en ny strategi? Natos gällande ”strategiska koncept” antogs 1999, men sedan dess har världen förändrats på ett dramatiskt sätt. Då var Nato en regional allians som koncentrerade sig på försvarsreaktioner till skydd av det egna området.Men att reagera räcker inte längre. Idag är den viktigaste uppgiften att förebygga kriser, väpnade konflikter och krig, vilket kan kräva att den första reaktionen är en annan än militär.

Nato enades vid konferensen i Prag 2002, om att agera ”där det behövs” och övergav på så sätt begränsningen att enbart kunna agera för att försvara det egna fördragsområdet.

Slutligen är Natos resurser rent militära samtidigt som den läxa vi lärt oss efter terrorattackerna den 11 september 2001 är att ingen av dagens konflikter kan bekämpas med enbart militära medel. Således måste varje ­effektiv framtida strategi för Nato inkludera utveckling och tillämpning av andra metoder.

Snarare än att ha Natos nuvarande regionala fokus är den strategi vi föreslår globalt inriktad. Den strävar efter att förhindra konflikter genom att avlägsna orsakerna till konflikter. Detta måste självklart i första hand ske med hjälp av icke-militära medel i förebyggande syfte, inte genom att reagera i efterhand.

Strategin innebär upptrappning och nedtrappning av styrka på ett flexibelt sätt och utnyttjar alla grepp som finns inom politik och maktutövning – hårda och mjuka. Den betonar emellertid att militär makt alltid måste vara det yttersta medlet – vilket inte nödvändigtvis innebär att det är det sista.

Vår strategi är till sin natur ­defensiv. Dess syfte är att skydda Natoländerna. Ingen som läser skriften kan missförstå detta.

Strategin kräver ett uthålligt engagemang tills det uppsatta målet är nått – ett mål som varken innebär erövring eller försök att tvinga på en motståndare Natos politiska ideal.

Läs mer på svensson

 https://www.zaramis.nu/blog/2008/03/16/militariseringen-i-klimathotets-spar/

Om Claes

A blogger and general internet nerd from Sweden. I write about politics, internet, technology, the world around me and whatever else interest me. I write mostly in swedish but some english.
Det här inlägget postades i Europa-EU, Säkerhetspolitik och har märkts med etiketterna , , . Bokmärk permalänken.

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