Om man läser vad som skrivits om Georgiens och Rysslands väg mot krig måste jag undra om Georgien förväntade sig att NATO och eller USA skulle ingripa om landet militärt försökte återta de förlorade provinserna. Fick Georgien löften vid NATO mötet i Bukarest som gav intrycket att de hade säkerhetsgarantier från NATO och USA. Vad Angela Merkel ska ha sagt nedan ger mig det intrycket.
Var det en tillfällighet att USA en månad före Georgiens försök att återta hade en gemensam militärövning i landet. Kunde alla de militärer och rådgivare från USA som då vistades i landet helt missat förberedelserna för att återta provinserna.
Jag har en känsla av att någonstans folk allvarligt misstagit sig på vad den ryska reaktionen skulle bli. Frågan är om Ryssland nu kommer att nöja sig med något annat än officiell självständighet för Abchasia och Syd-ossetsien och om Saakashvili kommer att kunna sitta kvar som politisk ledare.
I förlängingen handlar det om hela det forna öst-europa och de ryska minoriteter som finns där. Om Kosovo kan få självstädnighet varför inte de lär bli det ryska argumentet. Ser man sedan lite längre handlar det om samarbete eller konflikt med ryssland i mellanöstern ocv centralasien där t ex landtransporter genom ryssland och centralasien är det enda backup alternativet till att försörja trupperna i Afghanistan om landvägen från Pakistan blir omöjlig.
Och som NY-times artikeln nedan gör klart. Georgien kommer inte att få någon militär hjälp från varken USA eller NATO. Trots rutinmässiga fördömanden handlar det inte om några konkreta åtgärder från varken USA, NATO eller EU. I praktiken handlar det om ett erkännande av en ryss intressfär eller röd linje för nato expansion. Carl Bildt verkar leva ganska långt ifrån realiteterna i Washington och Brussel. Gäller fortfarande den svenska säkerhetspolitiska doktrin som säger östersjön är den eviga fredens hav.
Förövrigt vilken nytta gjorde FRA i denna röra?
News Analysis – In Georgia Clash, a Lesson on U.S. Need for Russia – News Analysis – NYTimes.com
WASHINGTON — The image of President Bush smiling and chatting with Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin of Russia from the stands of the Beijing Olympics even as Russian aircraft were shelling Georgia outlines the reality of America’s Russia policy. While America considers Georgia its strongest ally in the bloc of former Soviet countries, Washington needs Russia too much on big issues like Iran to risk it all to defend Georgia.
And State Department officials made it clear on Saturday that there was no chance the United States would intervene militarily.
Mr. Bush did use tough language, demanding that Russia stop bombing. And Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice demanded that Russia “respect Georgia’s territorial integrity.”
What did Mr. Putin do? First, he repudiated President Nicolas Sarkozy of France in Beijing, refusing to budge when Mr. Sarkozy tried to dissuade Russia from its military operation. “It was a very, very tough meeting,” a senior Western official said afterward. “Putin was saying, ‘We are going to make them pay. We are going to make justice.’ ”
Then, Mr. Putin flew from Beijing to a region that borders South Ossetia, arriving after an announcement that Georgia was pulling its troops out of the capital of the breakaway region. He appeared ostensibly to coordinate assistance to refugees who had fled South Ossetia into Russia, but the Russian message was clear: This is our sphere of influence; others stay out.
“What the Russians just did is, for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union, they have taken a decisive military action and imposed a military reality,” said George Friedman, chief executive of Stratfor, a geopolitical analysis and intelligence company. “They’ve done it unilaterally, and all of the countries that have been looking to the West to intimidate the Russians are now forced into a position to consider what just happened.”
And Bush administration officials acknowledged that the outside world, and the United States in particular, had little leverage over Russian actions.
“There is no possibility of drawing NATO or the international community into this,” said a senior State Department official in a conference call with reporters.
Claeskrantz.se – En politisk blogg om Sverige och omvärlden
The breakaway regions were thus a stick of dynamite waiting to be lit. And Mr. Putin struck a match. Although Russia, as the peacekeeping power, was charged with preserving an international consensus that recognized Georgia’s claims over Abkhazia, Russia lifted sanctions on Abkhazia last March. This had nothing to do with local events: Mr. Putin had tried for years to prevent Kosovo from declaring its independence from Serbia, and when the Kosovars went ahead, with strong American and European support, last February, Mr. Putin responded by leveling a blow at America’s Caucasus darling.
Soon afterward, the Russian Duma held hearings on recognition of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, a pro-Russian breakaway republic in Moldova. Moscow argued that the West’s logic on Kosovo should apply as well to these ethnic communities seeking to free themselves from the control of a hostile state. And then, in mid-April, Mr. Putin held out the possibility of recognition for the breakaway republics.
Now things began to degenerate rapidly. On April 21, Mr. Saakashvili called the Russian leader to demand that he reverse the decision. He reminded Mr. Putin that the West had taken Georgia’s side in the dispute. And Mr. Putin, according to several of Mr. Saakashvili’s associates, shot back with a suggestion about where they could put their statements. Mr. Saakashvili, prudent for once, shied from uttering the exact wording, but said that Mr. Putin had used “extremely offensive language,” and had repeated the expression several times.
Mr. Saakashvili was shaken by the naked hostility. He already feared that the West, or at least Europe, would never rally to Georgia’s side in a crisis; and here was Mr. Putin saying that the West’s support meant nothing to him. Here, indeed, was 1938.
The atmosphere during the early spring was electric with tension. Georgia accused Russia of shooting down a drone aircraft over Abkhazia; a United Nations report later confirmed the claim. Russia loudly insisted that Georgia was preparing for war; the Georgians had, indeed, mobilized troops and prepared fuel dumps.
Mr. Saakashvili was deeply disappointed when NATO declined in early April to put Georgia and Ukraine on the path to membership, but he says that the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, explained to him that while the Germans “don’t want to be pushed” on NATO, they might offer their support later this year. Almost as satisfying to Mr. Saakashvili was his discovery that Ms. Merkel “gets it” about Russia — “because she knows Russia from her own experience.”
Near the border, Georgian soldiers were bewildered that they had been pushed out. Exhausted troops, their faces covered with stubble, said they were angry at the United States and EU for not coming to Georgia’s aid.
A Georgian major who only gave his name as Georgy, said, “Over the past few years I lived in a democratic country, and I was happy. Now America and the European Union spit on us.” He was driving an armored truck out of South Ossetia.
Shortly before dawn on Sunday, Georgia’s Interior Ministry said that Russian bombers had begun striking the airport at Tbilisi. The explosions could be heard in the city, Utiashvili said.
He said that Russia had built up large forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia — breakaway regions that have support from Moscow — including as many as 300 artillery pieces in South Ossetia alone. Russian forces, he said, were also poised just over the borde